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From the early 1970s until the mid-80s, most measures suggested that the role 
of  multinationals in the world economy had largely stabilized. In particular, 
U.S. firms in Europe were no longer growing much faster than the European 
economy as a whole, while many Third World countries, finding bank lending 
available as an alternative source of finance, tightened restrictions on invest- 
ment by multinationals. Except for a gradually rising share of  foreign owner- 
ship in the U.S. economy, there was little indication of a broad trend toward 
further globalization of firms’ activities. Beginning around 1985-86,  however, 
firms began a new wave of foreign direct investment (FD1)-that  is, foreign 
investment aimed not simply at securing future income but also at establish- 
ing control. 
The United Nations Center on Transnational Corporations (UNCTC), using 
International Monetary Fund data, has estimated that during the five years 
1985-89,  world FDI flows totaled over $630 billion on a balance-of-payments 
basis. FDI on a balance-of-payments basis is a measure of changes in owners’ 
equity in business organizations or real assets that these owners control. The 
$630 billion figure cited above thus is far short of the total value of assets that 
came under foreign control as a result of FDI. If the ratio of owners’ equity to 
total asset value of all FDI worldwide is equal to this ratio for FDI in the United 
States, then upwards of $3,580 billion of business assets came under foreign 
control during the 1980s’ FDI boom. During the period 1983-89, world FDI 
flows (expressed in U.S. dollars at current prices) grew at annual compound 
growth rates of 28.9 percent; world income grew at about one-fourth this rate 
(7.8 percent), and world trade at less than one-third (9.4 percent) (U.N. Center 
on Transnational Corporations 1991). 
The surge in FDI after 1985 was largely a surge in investment flows among 
industrialized nations. The UNCTC data show that the G5 nations (France, 
West Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States) were the 
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home (source) nations of  almost 70 percent of  FDI flows  during this time, 
while nations classified by the United Nations as “developed market econo- 
mies” were home to most of  the remaining FDI flows. The G5 nations were 
also host (recipient) nations to 57 percent of these flows, and developed market 
nations in total were host to 8  1 percent. The share of FDI flows going to devel- 
oping nations thus was only about 19 percent, a low share by the standards of 
earlier decades. Of this share, an overwhelming majority went to a small group 
of nations, notably Mexico, Brazil, and the Asian newly industrializing coun- 
tries (NICs). (See table 1.1). 
Why is the late-80s surge in direct investment important? Most immediately, 
FDI came to play a key role in financing international current account imbal- 
ances: in 1989, nearly half of the U.S. current account deficit was financed by 
inflows of direct investment rather than by  more conventional short-term and 
portfolio investment, whereas Japan used more than two-thirds of its current 
account surplus for direct investment. In effect, the U.S. raised the money to 
pay  for its imports by  selling foreigners companies instead of  bonds. Japan 
similarly used much of the revenue from its exports to acquire overseas subsid- 
iaries instead of passive assets. 
Beyond its immediate financial role, foreign direct investment implies a ris- 
ing share of  foreign ownership in those economies that have  been its main 
recipients. To  the extent that foreign-owned firms behave  differently from 
those with domestic owners, this may have important long-term economic im- 
plications. Equally important, concern over how foreign firms might behave 
has inevitably become an  important political issue. 
Finally, the surge in direct investment is an indicator of other changes now 
taking place in the world economy. To the extent that we can understand this 
investment, it may provide valuable clues to other economic trends as well. 
This paper provides some background information on and a conceptual 
framework for the growth of  direct investment. The intention is to stimulate 
discussion that can be used to guide subsequent study. 
The paper is in four parts. The first part reviews briefly some evidence on 
the growth of direct investment in the 1980s. The second part then lays out a 
conceptual framework  for  thinking  about  the  causes  and  possible  conse- 
quences of direct investment. The third part identifies a series of central ques- 
tions regarding FDI. Finally, the last section briefly sketches some possible 
directions for future study. 
1.1  Trends in Direct Investment 
1.1.1  Measurement Issues 
In principle, firms could become multinational or increase their operations 
abroad without any international movement of capital per se. For example, a 
British firm could acquire a U.S. firm with funds borrowed in  the United 15  The Surge in Foreign Direct Investment in the 1980s 
Table 1.1  Stocks and Flows of FDI Inward and Outward, by Region ($ billions) 
Outward Stock  Inward Stock 
Rate of  Rate of 
Region  1980  1988  Growth  1980  1988  Growth 
United States  $220  $  345 
European Community (EC)  203  492 
EC (excluding intra-EC)  153  332 
Intra-EC  50  160 
Rest of world  81  86 
World total (including 
intra-EC)  524  1,034 
Japan  20  111 
5.6%  $  83  $  329  17.2% 
11.1  188  399  9.4 
9.7  143  239  6.4 
14.5  45  160  15.9 
21.4  3  10  15.0 
0.7  235  48 1  9.0 
8.5  509  1,219  10.9 
Sources: Unpublished estimates  by  the United  Nations Center  on Transnational Corporations 
(UNCTC); UNCTC (1991), World Investment Directory (New York: United Nations); UNCTC 
(1991). World Investment Report 1991 (New York United Nations). The estimates are derived 
from national government sources, which use somewhat differing accounting standards. For exam- 
ple, Japan and several European nations do not count retained earnings by  affiliates of foreign 
firms as FDI, whereas most other nations do. Hence, reported total inward flows do not equal 
reported total outward flows. 
States; a Japanese firm could acquire a U.S. firm via an exchange of stock with 
an already existing subsidiary. In either case, there would be an increase in the 
share of the U.S. economy controlled by foreign firms, but no inflow of capital. 
Ideally, therefore, the analyst should measure the growth of multinational en- 
terprise by looking directly at the share of each economy controlled by foreign 
firms rather than by  loolung at capital movements. Trends in  globalization 
could then be measured from these shares. 
Unfortunately, numbers on the share of  economies controlled by  foreign 
firms are spotty and lag well behind actual events. Efforts have been made to 
create such numbers: table 1.2 contains illustrative figures on the share of G5 
economies that foreign firms control by a variety of measures. We will discuss 
some of the implications of these numbers below. For now, however, the im- 
portant point to note is that direct information on control is both too difficult 
to calculate and too tardy to be useful in tracking rapid changes. In particular, 
the most recent available data on foreign control tend to lag from three to five 
years behind actual events; because other measures show a sudden increase in 
FDI since about 1985, this is a fatal defect. 
As a result, it is necessary to rely on other measures to track recent develop- 
ments. The most commonly used measure is flows of foreign direct investment, 
as appear in national balance-of-payments accounts. 
The balance-of-payments accounts define direct investment as that part of 
capital flows that represents a direct financial flow from a parent company to 
an overseas firm that it controls. Accounting standards vary from country to 
country, resulting in some problems of consistency when national figures are 
aggregated. By International Monetary Fund (IMF) standards, however, FDI 16  Edward M. Graham and Paul R. Krugman 
Table 1.2  Role of Foreign-Owned Firms in G5 Economies, 1977  and 1986 
G-5 Country 
Percentage Share 
Held by Foreign- 
Owned Firms 
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3  7 
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2  1 
24  27 
18  21 
N.A.  N.A. 
17  18 
14  13 
17  17 
22  20 
15  14 
N.A.  14 
Source: Dee Anne Julius and Stephen Thomsen (1988),  Foreign-owned firms, trade, and economic 
integration, Tokyo Club Papers 2 (1):  151-74. 
Note: N.A. = not available. 
consists of the sum of (1) new equity purchased or acquired by parent compa- 
nies in overseas firms they are considered to control (including establishment 
of new subsidiaries), (2) reinvestment of earnings by controlled firms, and (3) 
intracompany loans from parent companies to controlled firms. The often re- 
ported stock of direct investment is simply not the cumulation of these flows 
over time. 
The balance-of-payments measure of direct investment contains a number 
of well-known defects: 
1. Control: The definition of a controlled firm is ambiguous. Majority con- 
trol is clearly too strict a criterion, since a smaller stake may be sufficient to 
give effective operating control. In U.S. data, 10 percent ownership of equity 
by a single foreign owner is deemed to make a U.S. firm foreign; this leads to 
a few obvious misclassifications in the opposite direction, of  which the best 
known is DuPont, considered foreign because of Seagram’s 23 percent stake. 
2. Debt: Only intracompany debt is counted as direct investment. Thus, if 
British Petroleum’s U.S. subsidiary borrows directly from its U.K. parent, this 17  The Surge in Foreign Direct Investment in the  1980s 
is considered a direct investment; borrowing directly on the Eurodollar market, 
however, is not, even if the debt is guaranteed by the parent firm. More gener- 
ally, investment financed by anything other than intracompany debt or equity 
does not count as direct investment even if it effectively increases the share of 
the economy controlled  by foreign firms. The assets of foreign-controlled  firms 
in every country, even measured at book value, are thus much larger than the 
balance-of-payments-based measures of the stock of direct investment. 
3.  Book versus market value: While retained earnings are counted as part of 
direct investment, capital gains (including pure inflation) are not. In effect, 
direct investment is counted as historical cost. This leads to an understatement 
that varies substantially depending on the age of the investments; U.S. direct 
investment abroad is widely viewed as much more understated than foreign 
investment in the United States simply because it is of older vintage.’ 
Because of  these defects, direct investment numbers from the balance of 
payments are unreliable guides to either the actual extent of foreign control in 
any economy or the value of a country’s assets abroad. Conversely,  the balance- 
of-payments numbers have two great advantages: they are available on a rea- 
sonably comparable basis for many countries, and they usually become avail- 
able within a few quarters of actual events. 
The best compromise seems to be to use, where available, direct evidence 
on the role  of  foreign-controlled firms to provide a baseline, then to use 
balance-of-payments data as an indicator of recent developments. That is the 
approach followed below. 
1.1.2  Trends in Direct Investment 
As already noted, table 1.2 contains comparisons of share measures of for- 
eign ownership for 1977 and 1986. Several points should be noted about these 
numbers. First, the numbers lag well behind events. The most recent numbers 
are for 1986. Since, as stated above, other evidence points to a surge in direct 
investment that began in 1985-86, this evidence completely misses the devel- 
opments that are at the center of this paper’s concern. We therefore need to use 
other data to infer what must have been happening more recently. Second, the 
numbers show no upward trend in the foreign share of either the European or 
the Japanese economies. The only notable change is a rise in the foreign- 
controlled share of the U.S. economy. The suggested conclusion is that “glob- 
alization” did not show any general upward trend before the late 1980s. We 
will show below that the U.S. rise may be attributed largely to a brief surge in 
the period 1978-81,  which can be viewed as a forerunner to the later, post- 
1985 surge. Third, Japan has remarkably little foreign penetration. This obser- 
vation will be confirmed from other data later on. 
1. The U.S. Department of Commerce has recently begun to publish estimates of the stocks of 
U.S. inward and outward investment at current market value and current replacement cost, as well 
as at historical value. 18  Edward M. Graham and Paul R. Krugman 
Aside from the rise in foreign ownership in the United States, the data in 
table 1.2 provide little indication of the recent surge in foreign direct invest- 
ment. Table 1.3 shows why. It provides data on flows of foreign direct invest- 
ment from and to developed countries, as measured by  the balance of  pay- 
ments. It shows that these flows were actually quite low in 1982-84; only after 
1985 did the surge take place. 
An even clearer picture emerges if we look at the balance-of-payments  num- 
bers in three crucial directions (table 1.4): first, the flow of direct investment 
into the United States; second, the flow out of Japan; third, the flow into Spain, 
the largest recipient of North-South direct investment within Europe. We  see 
a brief surge in investment into the United States in 1978-81; then, a second, 
larger wave of investment into the United States, out of Japan, and (smaller in 
dollar terms) into Spain began. 
Who are the foreign direct investors, and where are they investing? Table 
1.5 presents a crude tabulation of  the cumulative outward and inward direct 
investment flows from 1981 through 1988, both in dollar terms and as a share 
of 1988 gross national product (GNP), for a number of countries. These num- 
bers yield five observations: 
1. In dollar terms, foreign direct investment flows are dominated on both 
the outward and the inward side by transactions among the large, advanced 
nations. That is, the rise in direct investment has been primarily a North-North 
issue between countries at similar levels of development, rather than a North- 
South issue. 
2. The United States has emerged as the largest destination for direct invest- 
ment. This is not simply a matter of relative size; the United States has been a 
Table 1.3  FDI Flows of Developed Countries, 1981-1990 ($ billions) 





































Sources; 198 1-85  data: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) un- 
published etimates: 1986-90  data: United Nations Center on Transnational Corporations (1992). 
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Table 1.4  Key FDI Flows, 1975-1988  ($ billions) 
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Source: Unpublished estimates by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. 
Note: N.A.  = not available. 
Table 1.5  Direct Investment by Country, 1981-1988 
Outward  Inward 



















































Source: Unpublished estimates by Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. 
substantial net importer of direct capital, and it ranks high even when inflows 
are measured as a share of GNP. 
3.  Japan has become a major direct investor abroad (in 1988, its direct in- 
vestment exceeded that of the United Kingdom). While gross direct investment 
flows are still a somewhat smaller share of  GNP than are those of European 
nations, these numbers represent a dramatic shift from Japan’s earlier strong 
preference for short-term and portfolio investment. At the same time, Japan 20  Edward M. Graham  and Paul R. Krugman 
remains a strikingly small host nation to inward direct investment. During the 
198Os, the huge Japanese economy was the recipient of less inward investment 
than the tiny economy of Greece! 
4.  The United Kingdom apparently presents a striking picture of globaliza- 
tion through two-way investment flows. The country was simultaneously the 
largest outward direct investor and the second-largest destination; as a share of 
GNP, the United Kingdom’s FDI  ranks at the top in both categories. 
5. Finally, direct investment flows to the nations of southern Europe, while 
minor from a global point of view, have been very significant relative to the 
size of those economies. 
1.1.3. 
In any attempt to interpret the aggregate trends just described, it will be 
important to have  some sense of  where the money is going. A brief look at 
some U.S. and Japanese data helps provide guidance. 
Perhaps the most important point to make is that one should be careful about 
stereotyping the pattern of direct investment. Much casual discussion seems to 
view Japanese direct investment in the U.S.  auto industry as the norm-that 
is, foreign direct investment is seen largely as a matter of Japanese firms with 
superior production skills building new  manufacturing plants abroad. While 
this does happen, it is not the typical case. Most recent direct investment in the 
United States is not from Japan; most takes the form of acquisition of existing 
firms, not construction of new plants; and most of  it is not in manufacturing. 
Table 1.6 compares the sources of recent U.S. direct capital inflows and the 
destinations of  recent Japanese outflows. While the flows from Japan to the 
United States are indeed large, the United States has also been a major host to 
FDI  from Europe and Canada. At the same time, Japan has sharply increased 
its investment in Europe as well as in the United States.* 
Information on  the  form  of  direct  investment cannot be  presented this 
simply. However, U.S. data clearly shows that greenfield plants are a quite 
minor part of the story. Acquisitions such as Bridgestone-Firestone or Sony- 
Columbia have been more prevalent than Honda-style plant openings. 
Finally, direct investment is not exclusively or even primarily a manufactur- 
ing issue. For example, while manufacturing accounts for a significant share 
of  the total inward investment into the United States and outward FDI from 
Japan, it is rivaled by banking and real estate. U.S. data (not shown here) re- 
veals that while the share of the United States manufacturing sector controlled 
by foreign firms exceeds that for the economy as a whole, the share of banking 
controlled by foreign firms is much larger. 
Direction and Composition of Direct Investment 
2. Although we do not show this, Europe has also become the host to significant new flows of 
FDI  from the United States, and intra-European FDI flows have also been substantial. 21  The Surge in Foreign Direct Investment in the 1980s 
~~ 
North America  47.5% 
Europe  19.4 
United Kingdom  8.4 
East Asian NICs  6.9 
Table 1.6  Percentage Distribution of FDI, 1988 
Canada  5.9% 
Europe  53.2 
United Kingdom  39.0 
Japan  31.9 
Japan’s Outflow  I  U.S. Inflow 
Sources: For Japan’s outflow: Ministry for International  Trade and Industry. For the United States’ 
inflow: US. Department of  Commerce, Survey of Current Business, various issues. 
1.1.4  Keys to Thinking about Trends 
At  the risk  of  oversimplifying, we  would  suggest four key  facts about 
foreign direct investment that should guide our thinking: 
1. The growth of  direct investment does not look like a steady trend; in- 
stead, extended periods of  slow growth are punctuated by occasional surges. 
Any explanation of FDI growth must explain why. 
2.  Direct investment flows have not simply paralleled international capital 
flows, either in timing or in direction. The post-1985 surge in direct investment 
took place at a time of stabilizing or narrowing of imbalances in current ac- 
counts; it was not simply a matter of flows from surplus to deficit countries. 
3. Direct investment has mostly taken the form of acquisitions rather than 
of construction of new facilities. 
4.  Manufacturing is only a fraction, albeit a large one, of the direct invest- 
ment story. The service sector is of comparable importance. Indeed, foreign- 
owned firms play a larger role in U.S. banking than in manufacturing. 
1.2  Conceptual Issues 
1.21  FDI and the Economic Theory of the Firm 
Foreign direct investment is, in essence, the creation or expansion of  firms 
that operate across national boundaries. In principle, then, the first part of eco- 
nomic theory that should be consulted in thinking about FDI is not the theory 
of international trade and capital movements but rather the theory of the firm 
per se. That is, the key question ought to be, why does it sometimes make 
sense for two factories to be under common ownership? (And why is it some- 
times not a good idea?) If  we have a clear answer to this question, it is not 
much of a jump to extend the answer to the case in which the two factories 
happen to be in different countries. 
Unfortunately and somewhat surprisingly, economists have relatively little 
to say about why the economy is organized into firms and why the boundaries 
between firms are drawn where they are. For example, economists have not 22  Edward M. Graham and Paul R. Krugman 
been very successful at explaining why some industries are strongly vertically 
integrated while others are not. Why did General Motors absorb Fisher Body, 
while IBM has not tried to do the same for Microsoft? It turns out that this sort 
of question is both a deep issue and a controversial one and that existing eco- 
nomic analysis provides, at best, suggestive guidance. 
This is too bad, because ultimately the assessment of both the prospects for 
and the effects of FDI depends on the economics of industrial organization. 
For example, Ford has reached an arrangement with Mazda (in which it owns 
a large stake) under which Mazda has largely taken over the design function 
for Ford’s small cars. Will this joint dependence eventually require the merger 
of the two firms? If  so, how will the behavior of the merged firm differ from 
that of the two firms from which it is created? These questions are on one side, 
obviously similar to issues involved in purely domestic mergers and acquisi- 
tions and, on the other, clearly unanswerable simply by looking at balance-of- 
payments questions. 
Because the economics of the firm are so crucial to the whole issue of for- 
eign direct investment, it is necessary to begin a conceptual discussion with a 
brief review of existing theory-even  though this theory tends to be vague and 
to lack operational content. Only then can the discussion turn specifically to 
multinational firms and FDI. 
There are two main strands in the economic theory of the firm. On one side 
is a set of propositions surrounding the question of the appropriate boundaries 
of the firm. On the other is consideration of where and how firms may expand. 
Optimal Boundaries of  the Firm 
Market transactions have costs: the seller and buyer may have to spend time 
bargaining, one or the other may cheat, they may be reluctant to reveal informa- 
tion that would help the other, and so on. Thus, there is always some incentive 
to remove dealings from the marketplace and conduct them within a hierarchi- 
cal organization. On  the other hand, hierarchies have their own  problems: 
rigidity and the dilution of incentives for individuals. 
The standard economist’s theory of the firm, originally proposed by Coase 
(1937) and elaborated by such modern theorists as Williamson (1975) and Hart 
(1989), is that firm boundaries are drawn in ways that achieve the best possible 
tradeoff between transaction and rigidity costs.3  Thus, by this reasoning, Gen- 
eral Motors acquired Fisher Body because it had determined that the difficult- 
ies of doing business with an independent supplier were greater than the ero- 
sion of incentives and flexibility that would occur when Fisher was absorbed 
by a much larger organization; IBM has not tried to acquire Microsoft because 
it judges that the reverse would be the case. 
When are transaction costs high enough to justify removing transactions 
from the market? Since transaction costs are elusive, this is a difficult question 
3. Buckley and Casson (1976)  pioneered the application of Coasian logic to multinational firms. 23  The Surge in Foreign Direct Investment in the 1980s 
to answer. One consideration that has received emphasis, however, is that trans- 
action costs are likely to be higher if  firms must make investments that are 
specific to each other. Suppose that Fisher must install expensive machinery 
suitable only for GM cars and that GM must design cars that can only be built 
if Fisher delivers the agreed-on components. Then, any dispute or failure of 
communication between the parties will be very costly. Suppose, on the other 
hand, that a supplier firm’s investments can be used to service any of a number 
of customers and that each customer can turn at any point to several suppliers. 
Then the costs of dispute will be low, and it will make sense to avoid creating 
a large, bureaucratic firm. 
This logic suggests that optimal firms should group closely related activities 
that are strongly dependent on one another and for which effective competition 
does not take place at any given moment. Grain merchants do not acquire con- 
trol of wheat farms; because a merchant and a farmer can always turn to other 
partners in the event of a dispute, the transaction costs are low. Conglomerates 
consisting of more or less unrelated activities do not make sense, because there 
are no transaction costs to save. But auto manufacturers own their stamping 
plants. 
A  clear dichotomy does not necessarily exist between market  activities 
among firms and hierarchical organization within firms. Long-term contracts 
and other relationships between firms with different owners may  bear little 
relationship to freewheeling auction markets, while marketlike incentive and 
control schemes exist within many firms. One economic view holds that a firm 
is simply a particular kind of  “nexus of contracts” (see Jensen and Meckling 
1976) that has proved so useful that it has become a standard form. The point 
of this view is that other kinds of long-term business relationships may be as 
durable and significant as the particular structure of firms visible at a given 
time. This may  be an important issue in considering the impact of  foreign 
direct investment, particularly by Japanese firms. 
Finally, there is not necessarily a one-way link between technological prog- 
ress and the optimal size of  firms. Improvements in telecommunications and 
computing, to take the most obvious example, cut both ways: they make it 
possible for large organizations to be more flexible, reducing the disincentive 
to extend firm boundaries; but they also reduce transaction costs and increase 
the flexibility of  small firms, making market arrangements more effective as 
well. It is an entirely open question whether firms in the year 2020 will be 
larger or smaller than they are today. 
The Growth of Firms 
While most economic analysis of  firms has focused on their optimal size 
and activities, managers may simply be trying to make the firms they run grow. 
They can, of course, decide that growth is not profitable and return earnings to 
stockholders; or they can decide that rapid growth will be profitable even if it 
must be financed by large debt issues. There is overwhelming evidence, how- 24  Edward M. Graham and Paul R. Krugman 
ever, that corporate management is ordinarily reluctant both to part with re- 
tained earnings and to borrow; that is, they view internally generated cash 
flows as cheaper than funds raised on the market. 
This suggests a perspective on the firm that is somewhat different from the 
economic analysis described above. Firm boundaries may be pushed out not 
so much because of efficiency gains but because the money is available! 
In the 196Os, the preference of firms for investment out of internally gener- 
ated funds was often used as a justification for the creation of conglomerates 
of seemingly unrelated activities. By combining a business that yielded high 
earnings but offered few investment opportunities (a “cash cow”) with one 
that presented opportunities but low earnings (a “star”), conglomerate  builders 
hoped to create gains. This strategy is now out of fashion: the problems with 
combining unrelated businesses are now apparent, and firms are enjoined to 
“stick to their knitting.” International expansion, however, offers firms a pos- 
sible way to stick to the businesses they know while opening up new invest- 
ment opportunities. 
Emphasizing the role of  cash in the determination of  firm growth is also 
important in trying to explain the timing of changes in firm strategies. As we 
will argue below, it is difficult to make sense of the suddenness of the surge in 
FDI  without appealing to some influence from the wealth of firms. 
1.2.2 
Economists generally believe that there is a long-term trend toward an in- 
creasing role of  multinational firms in the world economy. From the early 
1970s to the mid-l980s, as seen above, there was an apparent pause in that 
trend-if  it exists. But it is worth asking what factors might underlie a growth 
in cross-country ownership of firms over time. 
At varying levels of generality, we might suggest four reasons for long-term 
growth in multinational enterprise: increasing integration of  world markets, 
growing similarity of national markets, improved communication and control 
technology, and growing symmetry in the international generation of  tech- 
nology. 
Growing Integration 
Both the logic of the economic theory of the firm and experience suggest a 
close connection between the long-term growth of international trade and that 
of international direct investment. On logical grounds, if a firm is essentially a 
device for economizing on transactions costs, then multinational firms will 
normally be created to facilitate international transactions. In practice, the 
growth of multinational firms since World War I1 has accompanied a general 
growth in trade. 
Perhaps more interestingly,  the rise and decline of FDI in the pre-World War 
Long-Run Trends in Multinational Enterprise 
4. Penrose (1956) emphasized the role of growth in fostering the international spread of firms. 25  The Surge in Foreign Direct Investment in the 1980s 
I1 era paralleled the rise and decline of international trade. It is not generally 
realized that the trend of international trade over time has not been uniformly 
upward. The world economy was already highly integrated  by  1914;  the United 
Kingdom actually had a larger share of trade in national income at that time 
than it does today. During the interwar period, however, protectionism led to a 
general decline in international  trade as a share of world income. Estimates by 
economists such as Arthur Lewis (1978) indicate that the growth of interna- 
tional trade from the 1940s until about 1970 simply represented a recovery to 
1914 levels as a share of income and that only since then has trade risen to 
new heights. 
The interesting point then becomes that much the same is true of  foreign 
direct investment. Multinational enterprise played a surprisingly large role in 
the pre-World War  I world. Many pioneering manufacturing firms quickly 
went multinational. In its early years, for example, Singer produced sewing 
machines from one plant in New Jersey and one in Scotland. At the same time 
that Standard Oil was integrating crude production, refining, and distribution 
within the United States, it was also establishing control over distribution sys- 
tems and oil fields abroad. When economic nationalism fragmented the world 
economy in the interwar years, the importance of  foreign direct investment 
declined. The book value of the stock of U.S. direct investment abroad was 7.3 
percent of GNF'  in 1914. It was only 3.4 percent in 1946 and had recovered 
only to 6.9 percent by  1970 (see Wilkins 1970, 1989). 
Since both theory and experience suggest that growth in trade should lead 
to growth in the role of multinationals, we would expect the continuing rise in 
integration of the world economy since 1970  eventually to be reflected in more 
multinational  enterprise. In the United States, in particular, the share of imports 
in GNP doubled from 1970 to 1989, while the share of exports increased al- 
most as much. One would expect this to be matched, other things equal, both 
by greater U.S. direct investment abroad and by greater foreign direct invest- 
ment in the United States. 
Again, the growth of multinational firms does not necessarily have anything 
to do with overall movements of capital. Consider the following example. Sup- 
pose that there is some industry (not necessarily manufacturing) that in 1975 
contained five U.S. and five European firms. Further suppose that, owing either 
to new technological developments or to deregulation, this industry now be- 
comes truly global, with firms able to operate and compete in all markets. This 
more competitive world market may  be big enough to accommodate more 
firms than could either separate market alone, but it will probably not allow 
for the continued existence of ten firms; more likely it will only have room for, 
say, seven. Integration of the market, then, will necessarily be accompanied by 
a process of consolidation through mergers and acquisitions. These mergers 
and acquisitions will create multinational firms, and some of  the associated 
transactions will be  recorded  as foreign direct  investment for balance-of- 
payments purposes. But what is really happening is corporate restructuring, 
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Growing Homogeneity of  Markets 
One factor that on casual observation seems to be a reason for growing glob- 
alization of  companies is a convergence in demand patterns and other eco- 
nomic conditions among advanced nations. Even in  1970, the differences in 
wage rates, living standards, and culture among advanced nations were large 
enough so that a good deal of natural segmentation of  markets occurred for 
both producer and consumer goods. For example, Europeans demanded much 
smaller cars and appliances, European factories slower but more flexible capi- 
tal goods, than their U.S. counterparts. With the convergence since then, econ- 
omies of scope from multinational operation are greater: Ford can design and 
market (or arrange with Mazda to develop) a world car, one sold in essentially 
the same form in a variety of markets. Like the increase in integration gener- 
ally, convergence creates an incentive for cross-border acquisitions and merg- 
ers that reduce the number of firms in the world as a whole. 
Communication Technology 
This is a double-edged issue. Clearly it is easier in 1992 for a firm to coordi- 
nate the activities of a manufacturing subsidiary on another continent than it 
was in 1970. It is also easier, however, for the firm to coordinate activities with 
another firm ten thousand miles away. It is possible though not certain that 
technological effects have, on balance, fostered multinational operation. 
Symmetry of  Technology 
Until the mid-I970s, the United States was in a very asymmetric position 
with regard to multinational enterprise: while the country had extensive invest- 
ment abroad, foreign direct investment in the United States was limited. The 
main reason for this was probably the country’s leading position in technology. 
Multinational firms are disproportionately concentrated in sectors with large 
R&D budgets and large numbers of technical personnel, presumably because 
transactions costs of selling and licensing technology are particularly high. It 
was therefore natural that the country that generated most of the world’s new 
technology should also be the country in  which most multinationals were 
based. 
Whatever the global trend of FDI, this observation suggests that there should 
have been a trend toward growing foreign ownership of U.S. firms as the domi- 
nance of U.S. technology faded from 1970 to  1990. That this trend was not 
more apparent before 1985 should perhaps be surprising. 
For some or all of these reasons-and  certainly because of  the growth of 
world  integration on  other  dimensions-a  long-term trend  toward  greater 
cross-country ownership of firms is not a surprise. What needs explaining is 
why, instead of  a steady trend, we have seen pauses alternating with surges, 
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1.2.3  Surges in FDI 
While there may have been a long-run trend toward increasing FDI flows, 
the most apparent feature of the data is the existence of two huge surges in 
investment, one from 1978 through 1981 and the second since 1986. Whatever 
the long-run factors underlying the growth of FDI, any explanation of recent 
events must cope with this apparent tendency toward sudden surges. 
Three main explanations have been proposed for these surges in FDI: fluc- 
tuations in relative cost of capital, associated in particular with exchange rate 
fluctuations; changes in taxation; and actual or prospective changes in tax 
policy. 
Valuation Explanations 
World  financial markets have  become  increasingly integrated  since the 
1970s. In two major ways, however, this integration has fallen short of comple- 
tion. First, for reasons still unclear, equity markets are not all that closely tied 
together; international diversification of stock portfolios remains limited. Sec- 
ond, firms continue to regard internally generated money as cheaper than exter- 
nal borrowing (which also remains true in domestic markets). As a result, the 
valuation of  a given asset can differ substantially for firms based in different 
countries. Above, we argued that, to some extent, the growth of firms is driven 
not by considerations of optimal organization but by  the efforts of managers 
to find a use for available funds. Systematic differences in valuation between 
countries can therefore play a role in determining the pace of foreign direct 
investment. 
How does this help make sense of surges in FDI? Because particular shocks 
that differentially affect the prices that firms based in different countries are 
willing to pay for assets, or that affect the ability of  firms in one country to 
buy assets abroad out of available cash, can lead to surges in FDI even if there 
is no deeper reason for a further extension of multinational enterprise. We look 
for such shocks. 
The U.S. experience suggests one obvious candidate shock: the exchange 
rate. Both the 1978-81  and the post-1986 surges of direct investment into the 
United States coincided with periods of dollar weakness. While a weak dollar 
may make U.S. assets attractive, it should do so for both foreign and domestic 
firms. Thus, in principle, it need not encourage foreign direct investment. If 
firms are cash constrained, however, a fall in the dollar means that yen  and 
pounds go further in buying U.S. assets; the fall thus encourages a wave  of 
inward investment. Froot and Stein (1991) provide both a simple theoretical 
model that justifies a role for the exchange rate and some rough empirical work 
that confirms a strong correlation between dollar fluctuations and FDI into the 
United States. The surge in Japanese direct investment abroad since 1986 also 
corresponds to a record high for the yen. 
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high Japanese stock market pre-1990 may  have  made it easier for Japanese 
firms to invest abroad. Also, international differences in savings rates, which 
are generally understood to drive overall capital flows, may have some influ- 
ence on direct investment via the cost of  capital. There is a crude correlation 
between current accounts and FDI:  the United  States became the world’s 
largest destination for FDI in the same decade (though not at the same time) 
that it became the largest-deficit nation; after a lag, Japan’s emergent current 
surplus was followed by large FDI.  On the other hand, the peculiar position of 
the United Kingdom and the general presence of large two-way flows in West- 
ern Europe argue against a general emphasis on savings rates and the overall 
cost of capital. 
Tax Changes 
Scholes and Wolfson (1990) have pointed out that shifts in U.S. tax laws 
during the 1980s first acted to discourage foreign ownership, then removed this 
bias. The argument runs as follows: The accelerated  depreciation introduced in 
1981 was generally worth more to a U.S. based firm than to a U.S. subsidiary 
of a foreign firm, because most foreign governments tax repatriated income of 
firms, with a credit for taxes paid to foreign governments. A tax break from 
accelerated depreciation,  which is a pure benefit to a domestically owned firm, 
is partially offset by the reduced future tax credit for a foreign-owned firm. So 
accelerated depreciation,  other things being equal, discouraged foreign owner- 
ship. U.S. tax reform in 1986 removed this bias. Scholes and Wolfson point 
out that the timing of these changes helps explain the end of the 1978-81  FDI 
surge and the onset of the post-1986 surge. 
If this explanation has any validity, it should have some explanatory power 
across industries. For a variety of reasons, effective rates of corporate taxation 
vary considerably  across industries; the Scholes-Wolfson  argument says, coun- 
terintuitively,  that foreign ownership should be larger in industries with relative 
high effective tax rates. Work by Swenson (1989) confirms that this is true for 
the U.S. manufacturing sector. 
It is probably true that taxation plays an important role in multinational en- 
terprise more generally. Unfortunately, international corporate taxation is an 
extraordinarily complex subject that yields few clear answers. 
Trade Policy 
Obviously, at least some FDI is motivated by actual or prospective changes 
in  trade  policy.  On  one side, some direct investment is  clearly  aimed at 
avoiding actual trade barriers or forestalling prospective barriers. Japanese 
television firms set up operations in the United States in the late 1970s in re- 
sponse to a voluntary export restraint (VER); Japanese auto manufacturing op- 
erations in both the United States and Europe have been motivated at least to 
some extent by actual and prospective trade restraints. On the other side, actual 
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ment; manufacturing investment in southern Europe has clearly been stimu- 
lated by the combination of EC enlargement and the Europe 1992 program. 
Can changes in views about trade policy be a major explanation of the surges 
in FDI since 1985?  It seems unlikely. The most telling counterargument  is that 
trade policy issues apply most obviously to manufacturing, while the surge is 
not concentrated in manufacturing investment. 
Summary 
Conceptual discussion of  FDI trends tends to be unsatisfying, for a good 
reason: the central conceptual issues in FDI are the same as those of corporate 
restructuring in general and are equally elusive and problematic. The discus- 
sion yields three main points. 
First, direct investment should be thought of primarily as an issue in indus- 
trial organization, not in capital flow. That is, analysis should focus more on 
the reasons why  multinational firms exist and have  advantages than on  the 
international flows of money per se. 
Second, it is relatively easy to explain a long-term trend toward greater 
cross-border ownership of firms. It is not clear that technological change per 
se necessarily encourages further growth of  multinational enterprise, but the 
growing integration of the world economy certainly does. In fact, explaining a 
long-term trend is, in a way, too easy, since the observed history since 1970 
has been less of a steady trend than of occasional surges. 
Third, then, explaining these surges is the biggest conceptual and, in turn, 
empirical problem. That is, observation of broad trends toward globalization 
is easy; it is explaining why these trends suddenly came to a head in the third 
quarter of  1986 that is hard. 
1.3  Key Questions Regarding Foreign Direct Investment 
What questions most need to be answered about foreign direct investment? We 
would propose three, all of which are, of course, interrelated. First, why now? 
Why were the late 1980s marked by  so much increase in FDI? Second, what 
are the prospects for further FDI? Will the boom continue? Will it move in 
new directions (e.g., to Eastern Europe and the Third World)? Finally, what 
are the effects of foreign direct investment? Are there any risks that will require 
or, at any rate, provoke a policy response? 
1.3.1  Why Now? 
This question, already reviewed in  the previous section, is  deliberately 
posed as a question about recent events rather than a more general one. Ex- 
plaining a long sweep of multinational expansion is easy and has probably 
been overdone. What we confront instead is the problem of explaining a rapid 
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the Plaza Accord? Was it the prospective formation of regional trading blocs? 
Tax reform? Or did ongoing gradual trends simply reach some kind of critical 
mass? 
An unsettling possibility is that foreign direct investment may to some extent 
reflect irrational follow-the-leader behavior. Think of  FDI for a moment as 
financial restructuring, not that different from domestic waves of corporate re- 
alignment. Then ask how well economists understand the wave of conglomer- 
ate formation in the  1960s or the wave  of  acquisitions and buyouts of  the 
1980s. The era of  conglomerates in particular looks like a case of  financial 
fashion, which is now condemned as misguided. Is the enthusiasm for buying 
U.S. firms any better grounded? 
A related, equally unsettling possibility is that the wave of  FDI in the late 
1980s was a symptom of a worldwide epidemic of moral hazard in financial 
markets. It has become increasingly clear that financial deregulation after the 
late 1970s, while eliminating one set of  distortions, led to new  and perhaps 
worse ones. Financial institutions found themselves free to take risks with 
funds that were explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by their governments and, 
at the same time, found that they were no longer deterred from risk taking by 
the desire to safeguard the valuable “franchises” formerly created by barriers 
to entry. The best-known example of the new incentives to questionable risk 
taking is, of course, the U.S. thrift industry. It is arguable, however, that Japa- 
nese financial markets, led by thinly capitalized banks exposed to new compe- 
tition, represent an even bigger case of  moral hazard at work. In that case, 
much of  the surge in foreign direct investment may have represented not an 
efficient movement toward globalization but a kind of side effect of the unrav- 
eling of the world financial system. 
1.3.2  Prospects? 
Our guess at the prospects for FDI is closely related to our assessment of 
its causes. 
Two of the most influential proposed explanations of the surge in FDI since 
1985 strongly suggest that some of that surge may have represented a tempo- 
rary bulge and that the pace was inevitably going to slacken. If the valuation 
story is right, the combination of a low dollar, a high yen, and a sky-high Nik- 
kei played a major role in generating large FDI flows into the United States 
and out of Japan. Even if these conditions had persisted, there would have been 
a natural slowing of  the flow as the more obvious investment opportunities 
were exhausted. Given the financial developments of  1990 to date, we should 
have expected a sharp cutback in foreign direct investment-and  indeed we 
have. 
The tax story also suggests a limit. It basically posits a pent-up demand for 
ownership of U.S. firms from 1981 to 1986, held back by discriminatory tax 
treatment, and then a wave  of  investment when the tax laws were changed. 31  The Surge in Foreign Direct Investment in the 1980s 
Once opportunities have been exploited, however, one would expect to see the 
pace slow. 
On the other hand, if there are deeper trends that simply happened to come 
to a head in the late 1980s, the surge in FDI could resume. 
Prospects for North-South and potential East-West FDI are equally prob- 
lematic. Consider the following two plausible arguments: 
1. Large FDI flows to southern Europe represented a one-time shift of pro- 
duction in anticipation of increased access to the European market and will not 
be repeated. 
2.  The growing unity of Europe and multinational operation of its firms will 
lead to a continuing shift of  manufacturing to lower-wage areas on Europe’s 
periphery, implying high rates of  direct investment in southern and perhaps 
eastern Europe for a number of years. 
Either of these arguments could be right; they have very different implica- 
tions. 
To make an assessment of prospects, it is necessary to answer the first key 
question about the reasons for the recent surge in FDI, then use that answer 
together with other information to make a forecast. 
1.3.3  Effects? 
The balance-of-payments  implications of foreign direct investment are rela- 
tively straightforward. FDI flows have helped finance the U.S. current account 
deficit and recycle the Japanese surplus. They have actually posed a dilemma 
for Spain and Portugal, which have tried to maintain stable exchange rates 
while controlling inflation and have found the job difficult in the face of direct 
capital inflows. 
Beyond  the  balance-of-payments  effects,  the  longer-term  question  is 
whether and how foreign-owned firms will behave differently from domestic 
ones. The fear once expressed in Europe about U.S. firms and now expressed 
in the United States about Japanese and (to some extent) European firms is that 
these firms will use their operational control to the detriment of the host coun- 
try. Accusations by critics such as Prestowitz (1988) and Tolchin and Tolchin 
(1988) are that foreign-owned firms in the U.S. will shift high-wage jobs and 
high value-added production to the parent company and shift sophisticated ac- 
tivities such as R&D abroad. The result will, so these critics assert, be to reduce 
the growth rate of the host economy. 
Such concerns are not absurd in the light of  theoretical analysis. Multi- 
national firms are created for a reason; they are more than the sum of  their 
parts, and their subsidiaries therefore ought to behave differently from purely 
domestic firms. It is not implausible that this difference in behavior might in- 
clude hiving off some high-level activities to the parent firm. On  the other 
hand, it is not certain either: the conceptual foundations of  discussion about 
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Available empirical evidence does not confirm the critics’ fears. Studies by 
Graham and Krugman (1991) and by Julius (1990) basically find that foreign- 
owned firms behave very similarly to domestically owned firms in the same 
industry. They pay similar wages, engage in similar amounts of R&D,  and so 
on. The only clear difference is a tendency to buy inputs from home suppliers, 
leading to a higher import propensity on the part of foreign-owned manufactur- 
ing firms. This tendency, however, appears to decline as investments become 
more mature. 
Will this similarity in behavior continue? This question would of course be 
easier to answer if we knew why so much investment is now taking place and 
what its future prospects are. 
1.4  Studying the Issue 
What approach is most likely to help us answer the key questions just de- 
scribed? The standard answer is theoretical analysis of the basic motives for 
multinational enterprise, backed by econometric testing of hypotheses. There 
are, however, two difficulties with this standard approach. 
First, the theoretical analysis of the boundaries of the firm-what  the ques- 
tion of multinational enterprise is really about-is  a deep issue, one on which 
economists have made only modest progress. In a fundamental way, it involves 
concerns about bounded rationality that are at present beyond the limits of 
our formal understanding. So it is unlikely that theorists will produce really 
convincing models of FDI anytime soon. 
Second, econometric work is also likely to be difficult, in part because the 
theoretical base is limited. There are also practical difficulties. Aside from 
problems with the data, there are simply limits to how much can be accom- 
plished via statistical inference-especially  when subtle issues regarding the 
restructuring of  firms are involved. Clearly, room exists for an  alternative 
approach. 
The immediately apparent alternative is, to ask them what they are doing 
and why,  instead of  trying to infer the motives and behavior of  firms from 
poorly suited data. There are some known problems with this approach, but 
in conjunction with the ongoing process of more formal analysis, it could be 
very useful. 
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COIllmel'lt  Kenneth A. Froot 
Monty Graham and Paul Krugman have provided a useful overview of broad 
direct investment issues. Their most penetrating point is that temporary surges 
in FDI are more puzzling than the long-term trends in FDI. They consider three 
possible explanations for these surges: valuation effects, taxation, and trade 
policy. I want to comment briefly on this list and add several other explanations 
which I think are also important. 
One plausible way that valuation effects might affect foreign investment be- 
havior is discussed by  Froot and Stein (1991). They argue that if  external 
sources of finance are more expensive to corporations than are internal sources, 
negative shocks to relative domestic wealth can raise the cost of  capital to 
domestic bidders for corporate control. This in turn leads to a decline in do- 
mestic reservation prices relative to those of foreigners. As Graham and Krug- 
man mention, the exchange rate is merely one among many variables which 34  Edward M. Graham and Paul R. Krugman 
can transmit changes in relative wealth. Increases in internal liquidity (due, for 
example, to past profits) or increases in stock market value can also raise rela- 
tive corporate financial slack and thereby lessen a corporation’s reliance on 
expensive external financing. 
Unfortunately, there is relatively little systematic testing of this hypothesis 
outside of that using the exchange rate. Since the FDI time-series samples are 
so short, exchange rates alone probably cannot provide convincing evidence 
that valuation stories are correct. Nevertheless, as Graham and Krugman sug- 
gest, the fall in both Japanese outward FDI and Japanese stock prices during 
the 1990-92  period provides additional casual evidence that wealth effects do 
matter. 
Another possible explanation of  the recent surge in worldwide FDI-one 
which Graham and Krugman do not consider-is  the dramatic change in cor- 
porate financing techniques. In particular, during the late 1980s, the junk bond 
market matured and then partially collapsed. Bank lending for the purposes 
of  acquisitions and mergers also increased significantly over this period. Is it 
possible that these innovations actually had a substantial influence on world- 
wide FDI? 
To answer this question, let us look at the most conspicuous features of the 
recent FDI surge. First, the fraction of direct investments which took the form 
of  a merger or  acquisition increased, particularly in  countries such as the 
United States. Second, the decline in importance of  greenfield FDI in part 
made FDI an increasingly North-North phenomenon, as North-South flows 
grew considerably more slowly. Third, the fraction of  the acquisition price 
raised externally by the foreign acquirer increased substantially over this pe- 
riod. These facts are all consistent with the hypothesis that there have been 
important innovations in the corporate capital markets which have allowed 
takeovers to occur more easily and to rely more heavily on external financing. 
Corporate control is now a traded asset as never before. Indeed, the same capi- 
tal market innovation hypothesis is frequently used to explain the rise of U.S. 
domestic takeover activity during the late 1980s. Foreign multinational firms 
are likely to have similar access to these financing innovations. 
The financial-innovation story is interesting in that it does not necessarily 
lead to a temporary surge in takeover activity-FDI  may be permanently in- 
creased as a result. While there may have been some pent-up demand released 
when these innovations were initially popularized, junk bonds and highly le- 
veraged financing are here to stay as corporate financing alternatives. As a 
result, companies will remain likely to undergo a takeover whenever manage- 
ment systematically underperforms or whenever other bidders have some rea- 
son to value an ongoing business more highly. The hope is that a permanently 
higher level of M&A activity (domestic as well as foreign) may increase the 
average level of efficiency across the corporate sector. 
A second issue, which Graham and Krugman touch upon only briefly, is that 
surges may be caused by follow-the-leader behavior. It is important to empha- 35  The Surge in Foreign Direct Investment in the 1980s 
size that such herding outcomes can be the result of rational decision making 
and that they may lead to multiple equilibria. For example, if Coca-Cola de- 
cides to pursue direct investment opportunities in the Third World, Pepsi-Cola 
may rationally follow. Even if the investment is a risky one, Pepsi’s managers 
may wish to follow Coke. By following the leader, Pepsi’s risks remain about 
the same as Coke’s, which may help minimize the relative risk of underperfor- 
mance of Pepsi’s managers vis-8-vis Coke’s. Managers may attempt to achieve 
outcomes correlated with a benchmark when their skill (and ultimate pay) is 
evaluated relative to  that  benchmark. (For a  model along these lines,  see 
Scharfstein and Stein 1990). Naturally, such correlated choices create the pos- 
sibility of multiple herding equilibria. 
Another reason that management may rationally herd is that firm value may 
be maximized through correlated strategic choices. If firms minimize costs by 
smoothing production over time, then strategies which involve large fluctua- 
tions in output may be dominated by strategies which offer a lower return but 
a more predictable level of output. Thus, a firm may follow the leader for many 
types of foreign investment strategies (even when the strategy offers relatively 
low return). However, this hypothesis also implies that there are limits to the 
herding: firms do not follow a leader who chooses a very  “risky” strategy 
which has highly variable output over time. 
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Discussion Summary 
Karl Sauvant began by questioning whether the recent experience reflects a 
sustainable increase or just a surge. Recent liberalization of policy toward in- 
vestment, especially in services, may explain the recent increase and, if so, this 
will continue, He made several other points about FDI. First, it is a cumulative 
process: the stock of $1.7 trillion at book value means that just the reinvestment 
of earnings will generate substantial continued FDI. Second, the LDC share 
has declined from 30 percent to 20 percent, but this may reverse because Mex- 
ico, Argentina and India have become more open; also, some LDCs such as 
Taiwan and South Korea have become FDI exporters. Finally, the recent de- 
cline in the flow of FDI may be due to the fact that the inflow to the United 
States has declined because of the recession in the United States. 36  Edward M. Graham and Paul R. Krugman 
Robert Feenstra asked whether high U.S. interest rates in the early 1980s 
could have hurt FDI in the United States. 
Robert Lipsey then cautioned about the use of balance-of-payments data on 
FDI.  Those data may record an outflow even as the stock of FDI is increasing. 
Rachel  McCulloch  suggested that the apparent follow-the-leader pattern 
may reflect rational learning from the experience of the firms that went earlier. 
She cautioned that the annual flow variations can be dominated by the experi- 
ence of a small number of firms. 
Martin Feldstein observed that national governments may adopt market ac- 
cess policies that cause foreign firms to invest that would not do so if they 
could produce elsewhere and import. This is particularly true for firms in the 
pharmaceutical industry, but it can extend to any industry where firms want to 
sell to the government. FDI may be the price of  access to certain domestic 
markets. Feldstein believes that much of the two-way FDI can be explained by 
the fact that the firms involved are selling intermediate products and have to 
go where their customers are because of the nature of  supplier-buyer relations. 
This is true whenever it is advantageous to be near the buyer to participate in 
ongoing design activities or to provide product on a just-in-time basis. 
Edward  Graham stated that  80  percent of  FDI in  the United  States is 
financed locally in the United States. 
Raymond Vernon added that multinationals’ share of  current account trans- 
actions has increased substantially and is now an overwhelming share of total 
U.S. exports. 